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Ethics and exclusion: representations of
sovereignty in Australia’s approach to
asylum-seekers
KATHARINE GELBER AND MATT MCDONALD*
Abstract. From 2001, the Australian government has justified a hard-line approach to
asylum-seekers on the basis of the need to preserve its sovereignty. This article critically
evaluates this justification, arguing that the conception of sovereignty as the ‘right to exclude’
involves a denial of responsibility to the most vulnerable in global politics. We particularly
focus here on the ways in which the Australian government has attempted to create support for
this conception of sovereignty and ethical responsibility at the domestic level, through
marginalising alternative voices and emphasising the ‘otherness’ of asylum-seekers and
refugees. We conclude by suggesting what this might mean for the treatment of asylum-seekers
in global politics and for statist approaches to global ethics.
The protection of our sovereignty, including Australia’s sovereign right to determine who shall
enter Australia, is a matter for the Australian government and this parliament.1
Australian Minister for Immigration, Phillip Ruddock, 2001.
From August 2001, when the Australian military intercepted a vessel carrying over
400 asylum-seekers and refused to allow it entry to Australia, Australia’s approach
to asylum-seekers has been a particularly prominent issue in political debate. The
Australian government’s approach has elicited a strong response both domestically
and internationally and has even been attributed with the re-election of the
conservative Howard government in 2001. We argue in this article that the Australian
government has represented an approach to asylum-seekers consistent with inter-
national human rights norms as being mutually exclusive with the preservation of
national sovereignty. Ultimately, the government has defined sovereignty as the
‘right to exclude’, a conception of sovereignty consistent with pluralist English
School accounts of the normative basis of international society but with disturbing
implications for the treatment of asylum-seekers in that international society.
In this article we address three central questions. First, how has the Australian
government defined sovereignty regarding asylum-seekers? Second, how has this
* The research for this article was partially funded by a grant from the Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences, UNSW. We would like to thank Susannah Helman for her exceptional research
assistance, and Alex Bellamy, Cindy O’Hagan, David Armstrong and the three anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 Phillip Ruddock, House of Representatives Hansard, 18 September 2001, pp. 30869–72.
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conception of sovereignty ‘won out’ over alternative visions of political autonomy
and ethical responsibility? And third, what implications does such a conception of
sovereignty have for the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in global politics?
This article illustrates how the Australian government has gone about representing
sovereignty, and constructing support for this conception of sovereignty, in such a
way as to deny ethical responsibility to asylum-seekers in the face of both
international and domestic criticism of its actions. We argue that there is nothing
inevitable about conceiving of sovereignty in such terms: rather, this particular
conception of sovereignty reflects a series of choices on the part of the Australian
government, choices that have potentially crucial implications for the treatment of
asylum-seekers in global politics. If accepted as legitimate, the conception of
sovereignty as the ‘right to exclude’ would undermine the rights and thereby the
wellbeing of those (refugees and asylum-seekers) who do not enjoy the protection of
states in international society.
This article therefore provides an empirical analysis of discursive representations
of sovereignty in the Australian context, reflects on the implications of such
representations for asylum-seekers in international society, and links this analysis to
broader issues regarding the relationship between sovereignty and human rights and
the boundaries of ethical responsibility in global politics. The article proceeds in four
parts. First, we outline how we understand sovereignty and its relationship to human
rights, and discuss the ethical implications of alternative visions of the sovereignty-
human rights relationship. Second, we provide a brief overview of the central
dimensions of Australia’s asylum-seeker policies from 2001–03. The third and central
section of the article outlines how the Australian government has represented
sovereignty in the period in question and gone about constructing support or
resonance for this conception in the broader populace. Finally, we briefly reflect on
the implications this has for the treatment of asylum-seekers in international society
and for statist accounts of global ethics, while also outlining immanent possibilities
for the movement towards an alternative conception of sovereignty in the Australian
context: one guided by a recognition of obligations to vulnerable and suﬀering
outsiders.
Sovereignty and human rights
Given that the Australian government has represented the preservation of
sovereignty as inconsistent with international human rights norms, it is worth
reflecting broadly on the (vexed issue of the) relationship between sovereignty and
human rights in International Relations (IR). While in global ethics literature this
relationship can be characterised as a debate between cosmopolitan and communi-
tarian approaches about the best means of achieving human rights in global politics,
in IR literature the sovereignty-human rights relationship has been a particularly
prominent issue in English School debates about the normative foundation of
international society. For Hedley Bull, the sovereignty-human rights relationship
could be understood in the context of ‘the inherent tension between the order
provided by the system and society of states, and the various aspirations for justice
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that arise in world politics’.2 More specifically, Bull argued that the central ordering
principle of international society was the preservation of state sovereignty (and hence
order), which was the best possibility of allowing for the realisation of individual
wellbeing and preserving international society itself.3 In a contemporary context,
Robert Jackson4 has advanced this pluralist argument in warning against a poten-
tially emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. This view (of the primacy of
order and the norm of sovereignty defined as non-intervention) is itself arguably
based upon the recognition that a central motivation for the establishment of the
modern state system and the concomitant principle of sovereignty was to allow for
the realisation of individual wellbeing in an otherwise Hobbesian state of nature.5
In this (pluralist) account, the relationship between sovereignty and human rights
can be defined in one of two ways. First, it might be argued that the necessity of
preserving international society means that the preservation of state sovereignty
defined as non-intervention should be given priority over human rights norms when
the two come into conflict.6 Alternatively, it might be argued that the realisation of
human rights requires a commitment to the preservation of sovereignty defined as
non-intervention because states are the actors in international society most capable of
providing for individual wellbeing. This latter point, reminiscent of Bull’s character-
isation of the human rights-sovereignty relationship and communitarian approaches
to global ethics,7 certainly comes closest to the Australian government’s ethical
justifications for its treatment of asylum-seekers, as will be noted.
There are two levels, however, at which the issue of asylum-seekers questions the
ethical justifications for sovereignty defined in exclusive terms. First, the existence of
refugees and asylum-seekers points to the fact that some states are clearly falling
short of providing for individual human rights (namely the states from which
refugees and asylum-seekers are fleeing). A range of critical scholars of international
relations invoke this argument (the potential disjuncture between the state as means
and ends) as the basis for calling for alternative conceptions of security and
sovereignty in international relations.8 Second, and more fundamental to this article,
sovereignty defined as the right to exclude provides us with little basis for recognising
and addressing the needs of those who are stateless and are therefore without the type
of protection envisaged by pluralists and communitarians. This point is central to
the ethical and normative problems we have with the Australian government’s
conceptualisation of sovereignty, to which we will return later.
2 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan,
1995), p. 83, our emphasis.
3 Although it should be noted that Bull did acknowledge the possibility that concerns of justice
could, in the future, ‘win out’ over concerns of the preservation of order within international
society. Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 74–94.
4 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
5 Christian Reus-Smith ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’, Review of
International Studies, 27:4 (2001), pp. 519–38.
6 This point underpins Jackson’s rejection of the imperative for intervention in response to
humanitarian crises (in Quasi-States, and Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in
a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
8 Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17:2 (2001), pp. 313–26;
Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention
in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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A point inferred by much of the above is that there are alternative ways of
conceiving of sovereignty, and by extension its relationship to human rights. To be
sure, sovereignty may be defined as the right of states to non-intervention in domestic
aﬀairs,9 a definition that while potentially underpinned by ethical and normative
considerations, serves to deny ethical responsibility to those outside the territorial
borders of the nation-state. This should not be conceived of as the essence of
sovereignty in any timeless sense, however. As a growing number of analysts have
argued, sovereignty may be defined in such a way as to require a broadening of
boundaries of ethical responsibility, even to the point of necessitating a rejection of
the inviolability of state borders.10 Clearly, these diﬀerent conceptions of sovereignty
have diﬀerent implications for the treatment of asylum-seekers in international
politics. We argue here that sovereignty is ultimately a social construction, the
meaning of which changes in diﬀerent contexts.11 Once we acknowledge this, it
becomes imperative to investigate how this meaning is constructed and to assess the
implications that such a conception has for political practice.
In locating the meaning of sovereignty held by the Australian government
regarding its treatment of asylum-seekers, we focus in this article on the discursive
representational practices of the government itself. These representations may be
viewed as both general indications of the government’s beliefs and/or worldview, and
as important forms of political action. The critical discourse analysis approach
outlined by Norman Fairclough, defined as a theory and method for ‘studying
language in its relation to power and ideology’,12 is particularly relevant to our
analysis here. Discursive representations of sovereignty serve to encourage certain
policy approaches while marginalising others; prioritise the needs of certain groups
while ignoring others; and legitimise certain actors in speaking for particular political
communities while silencing others.13 As Werner and de Wilde have argued,
‘sovereignty . . . is a specific form of legitimisation whose reality consists of its being
accepted by relevant audiences’.14 This conception also raises an important point:
that an analysis of the construction of sovereignty requires an analysis of both the
representation and acceptance of particular conceptions of sovereignty. We therefore
also address the means through which this conception of sovereignty has come to
prominence in the Australian context. To this end, we assess the extent of support for
the government’s approach to asylum-seekers, and particularly reflect on the ways in
which the government has attempted to construct its conception of sovereignty,
9 Such a conception is evident in a range of definitions of sovereignty in international relations,
including negative (Jackson, Quasi States, pp. 27–9), external (Bull, The Anarchical Society,
pp. 16–17), juridical (Samuel Makinda, ‘The United Nations and State Sovereignty: Mechanisms
for Managing International Security’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 33:1 (1998), p. 104) or
Westphalian sovereignty (Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press,1999), pp. 3–4).
10 Such a conception of sovereignty is particularly apparent in the work of proponents of
humanitarian intervention. For example Wheeler, Saving Strangers; Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian
Intervention and International Society’, Review of International Studies, 29:3 (2003), pp. 321–40.
11 On this point, see Jens Bartelsen, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995).
12 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (London:
Longman, 1995), p. 1.
13 On this point see R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 159–83.
14 Wouter Werner and Jaap de Wilde, ‘The Endurance of Sovereignty’, European Journal of
International Relations, 7:3 (2001), p. 302.
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human rights and ethical responsibility as legitimate or even desirable. This has been
particularly prominent in its willingness to marginalise actors seeking to contest the
government’s conception of sovereignty (regarding asylum-seekers) as the ‘right to
exclude’.
Our problem with the government’s conception of sovereignty regarding asylum-
seekers goes beyond misgivings about the means through which the Australian
government has attempted to silence or marginalise alternative voices that have
characterised Australian obligations diﬀerently, however. As a number of commen-
tators have argued, sovereignty defined as the ‘right to exclude’ is inconsistent with
the specific requirements of a range of international conventions to which Australia
is a signatory.15 More importantly this conception of sovereignty can be (and we
argue has been in the Australian case) inconsistent with a basic humanitarian ethic
which dictates that ‘there is a duty incumbent upon each and every individual
to assist those in great distress or suﬀering when the costs of doing so are low’.16 To
be sure, the Australian government has emphasised its humanitarian credentials
and particularly the costs of admitting asylum-seekers arriving by boat (most
insidiously through pointing to the diﬀerent values of asylum-seekers). It is diﬃcult,
however, to accept that the costs of allowing entry to asylum-seekers in terms of
national cohesion or the preservation of Australian values could be so great as to
warrant the denial of assistance, particularly given that the modern Australian state
was founded on (and continues to encourage) immigration. It is also diﬃcult to
reconcile the above principles of humanitarianism with an approach to asylum-
seekers that has involved a far greater financial burden than that undertaken by states
with more welcoming asylum-policies, and that has even involved an increase in
the suﬀering of asylum-seekers, particularly through the policy of mandatory
detention.17
Sovereignty understood and approached as the ‘right to exclude’ regarding
asylum-seekers is, therefore, inconsistent with the global human rights regime that
states such as Australia have committed themselves to, and is inconsistent with a
humanitarian ethic in dealing with suﬀering outsiders that states such as Australia
should commit themselves to. While a theory of duties to strangers is clearly beyond
the scope of this article, our (broadly) cosmopolitan conception of political com-
munity18 underpins the desire to problematise the ways in which the Australian
government has sought to reject the claims of outsiders through drawing boundaries
of ethical obligation at (or indeed outside) the territorial borders of the Australian
15 William Maley, for example, argues that when Australia acceded to the 1954 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, ‘it relinquished as a sovereign act any absolute control over who could
enter the country and under what circumstances’. William Maley, ‘Asylum-Seekers in Australia’s
International Relations’, Australian Journal of International Aﬀairs, 57:1 (2003), p. 189.
16 M. Gibney, ‘Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees’, American Political
Science Review, 93:1 (1999), p. 178.
17 On these points, see Don McMaster, ‘Asylum-Seekers and the Insecurity of a Nation’, Australian
Journal of International Aﬀairs, 56:2 (2002), pp. 279–90. The increase in suﬀering of asylum-seekers
is particularly apparent in the context of the mental health implications of long periods in detention
centres, particularly for children. On this point, see Mitchell Smith, ‘Asylum-Seekers in Australia’,
Medical Journal of Australia, 175 (2001), pp. 587–9.
18 On this point, see Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge:
Polity, 1998), p. 206). For a discussion of partial and impartial approaches to the obligations of
liberal democratic states to refugees and asylum-seekers, see Gibney, ‘Liberal Democratic States’.
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state. Its conception and representation of sovereignty have been central to this
political project.
Interception and incarceration: Australia’s approach to asylum-seekers
While the Australian government has historically had a troubled approach towards
asylum-seekers and immigrants,19 arguably the first few years of the new century saw
the development of a particularly stark policy. This can be encapsulated and
symbolised by the two events which frame the analysis in this article: the Tampa and
Minasa Bone incidents. The first occurred in late August 2001, when a Norwegian
freighter called the Tampa was asked by the Australian government to rescue over
400 asylum-seekers whose boat was sinking in international waters, but was then
prevented from entering Australia’s migration zone. Australian SAS navy forces
subsequently boarded the ship and the asylum-seekers were sent to Pacific Island
nations for the processing of their claims. Subsequently the Australian government
legislated to toughen migration laws regarding asylum-seekers in several ways,
including by excising several islands from Australia’s migration zone.20
The second incident occurred in November 2003, when a boat called the Minasa
Bone carrying 14 Kurdish asylum-seekers ran aground on Melville island, 80 km
from Australia’s northern coast. While the asylum-seekers remained on their boat
awaiting assistance, the Australian federal government gazetted retrospective regu-
lations to remove Melville and up to 4000 more islands from Australia’s migration
zone. The excision became eﬀective 12 hours before the vessel was first sighted by
Melville Islanders21 and the boat was towed back into international waters and made
its way to Indonesia.22
The excisions of Australian territories from the migration zone followed earlier
legislative and policy changes designed to make it more diﬃcult for asylum-seekers to
lodge claims for refugee status in Australia. These have included the mandatory
detention of unauthorised arrivals (including children), first undertaken by the
federal Labor government in 1989;23 the reduction of opportunities for judicial
review of decisions about asylum status taken by the Department of Immigration;24
the ability to draw adverse inferences from asylum-seekers’ lack of identity docu-
ments;25 and the introduction of a category of temporary (three-year) protection visas
19 On Australia’s historical fear of (particularly Asian) immigration, see Don McMaster, Asylum
Seekers: Australia’s Response to Refugees (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001).
20 Katharine Gelber, ‘A Fair Queue? Australian Public Discourse on Refugees and Immigration’,
Journal of Australian Studies, 77 (2003), p. 29.
21 Sophie Morris, ‘New Bid to Repel Asylum Seekers’, The Australian, 5 November 2003, pp. 1, 6.
22 This created a diplomatic furore, with an Indonesian Immigration Department spokesperson
arguing that Australia was treating Indonesia like a ‘trash bin’. Kimina Lyall; Sophie Morris and
Marianne Kearney, ‘Not Your Trash Bin’, The Australian, 13 November 2003, p. 1. When
parliament reconvened on 24 November the regulations were disallowed by the Senate: Mark
Phillips, ‘4000 islands put back on the map’, Herald-Sun, 25 November (2003), p. 2.
23 McMaster, Asylum Seekers, p. 67.
24 Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, ‘Illegal Refugees or Illegal Policy?’, in Refugees and the Myth of the
Borderless World (Canberra: RSPAS, Australian National University, 2002), p. 20.
25 Gelber, ‘A Fair Queue?’, p. 29; Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs,
Media Release: Australia’s Border Integrity Strengthened by New Legislation, MPS164/2001, 26
September 2001, 〈http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/ruddock_media01/r01164.htm〉.
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for asylum seekers who made successful onshore claims for refugee status. As
introduced, the temporary nature of the visa – every three years the applicant had to
reapply for another temporary visa – prevented them from settling permanently in
Australia.26
This policy towards asylum-seekers arguably contravenes international law in-
cluding the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees,27 to which Australia is a signatory, and amounts to a denial of the
humanitarian imperative of responding to the immediate suﬀering of vulnerable
outsiders. It also sets a precedent for the abrogation of responsibility towards
asylum-seekers on the part of developed, liberal-democratic states.28 These points are
important to note in considering the normative basis of international society
generally, but also (for the purposes of this article) when considering the relationship
between these policies and a particular conception of sovereignty that is beginning to
define approaches to asylum-seekers in much of the developed world.
The Australian government has been subjected to harsh criticism internationally
and domestically for its treatment of those asylum-seekers who had gained entry to
Australia. The head of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Justice
Louis Joinet, noted following a visit in 2002 that criminals were treated better than
asylum-seekers given the indefiniteness of the latter’s detention,29 and that Australia’s
policies amounted to the grossest abuse of human rights he had seen in mandatory
detention facilities anywhere in the world.30 Justice Bhagwati, UN regional advisor
to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, described the mandatory detention
of children as contrary to international standards and law.31 Domestically, the
Australian government’s policies have been heavily criticised by refugee advocacy
groups and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, which tabled a
report in federal parliament that recommended the immediate release of children
from detention.32
The Australian government has responded defensively to United Nations’ criti-
cism of its domestic policies on human rights grounds, including by arguing that the
26 Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs [DIMIA], Fact Sheet 64:
Temporary Protection Visas, 2003, 〈http://www.dimia.gov.au/facts/64protection.htm〉. In August
2004 the system of temporary protection visas was modified slightly to allow some asylum-seekers
to apply for permanent visa categories after their initial temporary protection visa had expired:
Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs [CIMIA], Measures for
Temporary Protection and Temporary Humanitarian Visa Holders 2004, 〈http://www.dimia.gov.au/
refugee/tpv_thv/index.htm〉.
27 Fonteyne, ‘Illegal Refugees’, pp. 18; 20–21.
28 Maley, ‘Asylum-Seekers’, p. 187.
29 Michael Millett & Michael Bradley, ‘Criminals ‘better oﬀ’ than asylum seekers’, Sydney Morning
Herald, 7 June 2002, p. 2.
30 Michael Millett, ‘Worst I’ve seen says UN asylum centre inspector’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6
June 2002, p. 1.
31 Cynthia Banham, ‘UN deplores ‘‘tragedy’’ of asylum system’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August
2002, p. 1. For further examination of United Nations’ criticisms of Australia’s policies towards
asylum-seekers and on other grounds deemed racially discriminatory, see David Kinley and Penny
Martin, ‘International Human Rights Law at Home: Addressing the Politics of Denial’, Melbourne
University Law Review, 26 (2002), pp. 469–70. For more general criticism of Australia’s compliance
with the terms of international human rights treaties see Elizabeth Evatt, ‘How Australia
‘‘Supports’’ the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System: Comment’, Public Law Review, 12
(2001), pp. 3–8.
32 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [HREOC], 2004, A Last Resort? Report of the
National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention (Sydney: HREOC, 2004),
〈http://www.hreoc.gov.au//human_rights/children_detention_report/index.html〉.
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United Nations should focus its eﬀorts on those countries where egregious breaches
of human rights occur, rather than on the Australian issues they had commented on
which were matters for ‘domestic political debate’.33 Australia’s chair of the
Parliamentary Treaties Committee reportedly described the United Nations as a
‘theme park for indulging the fantasies of the global NGO movement – heaping
abuse on gold plated democracies like Australia’.34
In addition to these comments, the Australian government has in recent years
pursued a selective and conditional engagement with the international multilateral
human rights treaty system. In conjunction with the criticisms raised by the
Australian government towards comments by UN representatives, Australia an-
nounced that it would henceforth adopt a more ‘strategic’ approach to interaction
with the UN treaty committee system, and a ‘selective’ approach to reporting to
committees where ‘appropriate’.35 Foreign policy developments such as these have
been underpinned by a broader set of assumptions and commitments on the part of
the Australian government in defining the national interest and approaching global
politics. Centrally, these have involved an increased scepticism of international rules,
norms and institutions; an emphasis on bilateralism and traditional strategic
relationships with powerful states such as the US; and ultimately an emphasis on a
foreign policy characterised by a narrowly defined national interest rather than
‘unrealistic notions of global idealism’36 that had, according to the conservative
government, informed the previous government’s commitment to ‘good international
citizenship’.37 This general foreign policy orientation provides important context to
the government’s conception of Australian sovereignty regarding asylum-seekers.
Sovereignty: ethics and exclusion
Characterisations of sovereignty
In addressing the question of asylum-seekers from the 2001 Tampa crisis to the
Minasa Bone incident in 2003, the Australian government consistently defined its
approach as being underpinned by a concern for the preservation of Australia’s
sovereignty. In doing so the Australian government defined sovereignty ultimately as
33 Alexander Downer, Interview on ABC 7.30 Report: Government to Review Participation in UN
Treaty Committee System, 30 March 2000; Kinley and Martin, ‘International Human Rights Law’,
p. 468.
34 Robert Garran, ‘No need for UN’s help – PM’, The Australian, 31 August 2000, p. 2.
35 Alexander Downer, House of Representatives Hansard, 18 June 2000, p. 3606; Alexander Downer,
National Press Club Speech: Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign Policy Challenge,
7 May 2000, 〈http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/020507_fa_whitepaper.html〉.
36 Department of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade, cited in David Goldsworthy, ‘An Overview’, in Cotton
and Ravenhill (eds.), The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Aﬀairs 1996–2000
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 11.
37 On ‘good international citizenship’ see Andrew Linklater, ‘What is a Good International Citizen’,
in Paul Keal (ed.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1992). On broader
trends in Australian foreign policy under the conservative Howard government, see for example
Goldsworthy, ‘An Overview’; Joseph Camilleri, ‘A Leap Into the Past – In the Name of the
National Interest’, Australian Journal of International Aﬀairs, 57:3 (2003), pp. 431–53; and Matt
McDonald, ‘Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001’,
International Relations, 19:3 (2005), pp. 297–320.
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the right to exclude. There are two crucial dimensions of this conception of
sovereignty, evidenced in a range of representations to be noted below. First,
sovereignty is represented as a right or norm of international society rather than as
an empirical fact, the latter being more consistent with Stephen Krasner’s definition
of Westphalian sovereignty.38 Second, sovereignty is represented as being exclusive
with external forms of influence or involvement in domestic political aﬀairs.
Fundamentally, the Howard government’s conception of sovereignty is a pluralist
English School one, emphasising the imperative of non-intervention in domestic
aﬀairs, extending to the ‘absolute right of the (Australian) government to determine
who will enter the country and under what circumstances’.39 Indeed, as Robert
Jackson has argued, ‘non-intervention and sovereignty in this meaning are basically
two sides of the same coin’.40 In terms of an ethical framework, the consistency of this
conceptualisation of sovereignty with communitarian approaches is also particularly
apparent: the ‘right to exclude’ is the terminology Peter Carens uses in characterising
Michael Walzer’s communitarian account of states’ obligations to refugees and
asylum-seekers.41
The Australian government’s invocation of sovereignty regarding its treatment of
asylum-seekers was most pronounced in response to the issue of border control, when
Australia’s sovereignty (defined in terms of its territorial integrity) was represented as
being ‘threatened’ by the unauthorised arrival of boatloads of asylum-seekers.42
Indeed, the imperative of preserving Australian sovereignty was represented as
providing the central rationale for Australia’s response to the Tampa crisis. Foreign
Minister Downer argued that ‘at the heart of this (the Tampa issue) is the protection
of our territorial integrity’.43 Then leader of the government in the Senate, Senator
Robert Hill, noted that the protection of Australian ‘sovereignty . . . to put in place
measures to protect Australia’s borders . . . (was) the key issue’ in Australia’s
approach to the Tampa crisis.44 Another government member of Parliament argued
that ‘this [Tampa] has everything to do with national sovereignty’.45 In short, then,
an analysis of the representation of sovereignty is critical here precisely because
‘sovereignty’ was the basis upon which the Australian government defined its actions.
The central pillar of the Australian government’s discursive construction of
sovereignty regarding asylum-seekers, particularly concerning border control, was
the oft-expressed ‘right’ of Australia to decide, as Prime Minister Howard first put it,
‘who comes here and the circumstances in which they will come’.46 In many ways, this
became the government’s mantra regarding its approach to border control and
asylum-seekers. The Prime Minister reiterated this concern in almost identical
38 Krasner, Sovereignty, pp. 20–5.
39 Maley, ‘Asylum-Seekers’, p. 188.
40 Jackson, The Global Covenant, p. 27.
41 Peter Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, Review of Politics, 49:2 (1987),
p. 266.
42 There were also important representations of sovereignty regarding international criticism of
mandatory detention policies, however for the most part representations of sovereignty regarding
asylum-seekers centred on the question of border control.
43 In Anthony Burke, In Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Sydney: Pluto, 2001), p. 322.
44 Robert Hill, Senate Hansard, 30 August 2001, p. 27090.
45 Gary Hardgrave, House of Representatives Hansard, 30 August 2001, p. 30703.
46 John Howard, Interview with Alan Jones, Radio 2UE, 30 August 2001, 〈http://www.pm.gov.au/news/
interviews/2001/interview1199.htm〉.
Australia’s approach to asylum-seekers 277
language on a number of occasions in subsequent weeks and months,47 while Foreign
Minister Downer and Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock noted that it was the
‘sovereign right of Australia to determine who will enter its borders and the
circumstances of that entry’.48
This conceptualisation was itself based on a broader argument: that the control of
a state’s borders generally was an issue for that state alone. Prime Minister Howard
argued that allowing boats carrying asylum-seekers to reach Australia would
undermine ‘Australia’s control over its sovereign territory’,49 and that:
Every country has a right to refuse entry to the vessel of another country of course. It’s
fundamental to a nation’s sovereignty, a nation’s control of its borders.50
This idea was reiterated by other members of the government. Immigration Minister
Ruddock said, ‘it is clearly up to Australia to determine who can cross our borders
. . .’,51 and the Coalition government’s immigration policy statement in the lead up to
the federal election in 2001 stated that:
The Coalition maintains that it is the sovereign right of any nation to determine who does
and who does not enter its borders for temporary or permanent stay.52
Border integrity and sovereignty were invoked simultaneously and interchangeably
to justify the rejection of Australia’s obligation to process the claims of asylum-
seekers arriving by boat. In mid-2002, the Immigration and Foreign Aﬀairs Ministers
and the Attorney-General also applied this understanding of sovereignty to the
government’s controversial policy of mandatory detention, arguing that ‘immigra-
tion detention is an essential element underpinning the integrity of Australia’s
migration program and the protection of our borders’.53
The government’s frequent invocations of sovereignty as border integrity (in
relation to asylum-seekers) from 2001–03 therefore consistently and overwhelmingly
positioned ‘sovereignty’ on the one hand, and a more humane approach to
asylum-seekers on the other, as mutually exclusive. Perhaps more significantly in
terms of the meaning of sovereignty communicated, such an approach was defined in
normative terms. The definition of sovereignty as a ‘right’ of states in an international
society was most telling in this context. Prime Minister Howard noted in the days
following the blockade of the Tampa that ‘the protection of our sovereignty,
including Australia’s sovereign right to determine who shall enter Australia, is a
47 John Howard, Interview with Kerri-Anne Kennerley, Radio 2GB, 1 November 2001,
〈http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2001/interview1434.htm〉; Howard cited in Fran Kelly, ABC
TV 7.30 Report Tampa Retrospective, 26 August 2002, 〈http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2002/
s659178.htm〉.
48 Alexander Downer and Phillip Ruddock, Joint Media Release: Government Rejects UN Report on
Arbitrary Detention, FA 184, 13 December 2002, 〈http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/
fa184a_02.html〉.
49 John Howard, House of Representatives Hansard, 29 August 2001, p. 30569.
50 John Howard, Interview with Jeremy Cordeaux, 5DN, 29 August 2001, 〈http://www.pm.gov.au/
news/interviews/2001/interview1197.htm〉.
51 Phillip Ruddock, House of Representatives Hansard, 18 September 2001, pp. 30869–72.
52 Coalition, The Howard Government: Putting Australia’s Interests First, Election 2001: Immigration
Policy Statement (2001), p. 13.
53 Alexander Downer, Phillip Ruddock and Darryl Williams, Joint Media Release: Government
Rejects the Report of the UN Human Rights Commissioner’s Envoy into Human Rights and
Immigration Detention, FA109, 31 July 2002, 〈http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/
fa109_02_un_hr_report.html〉.
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matter for the Australian government and this parliament’.54 Immigration Minister
Philip Ruddock Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock used exactly the same
wording to define the government’s position three weeks later,55 while Leader of the
government in the Senate, Robert Hill, argued that ‘like every other country in the
world, we demand the right to protect our sovereignty’.56
This right extended, for the government, beyond the normative basis of inter-
national society to the legal basis of international order. Prime Minister Howard
evoked juridical sovereignty in arguing that ‘I think we have clearly a legal right to
defend the integrity of our own border’.57 A government Senator, Santo Santoro,
argued in 2003 that ‘it is wholly unexceptional that a sovereign country should have
the absolute right to decide who crosses its borders’. He went further in saying:
We must enforce our national right to determine who comes here to live, and when and
how they do so. Let us hear no more of this nonsense that we live in a borderless world or
that we owe a greater obligation than the people of other countries to those who would
prefer to bend the rules and come to our shores illegally.58
This comment positioned sovereignty-as-exclusion as a right of all states, while
further denying ethical obligation to those outside Australia’s borders and rejecting
the increasingly common argument that sovereignty defined in exclusive terms is
inconsistent with the imperative to address transnational issues such as people
movements.59
While it may be superficially appealing to define the government’s approach solely
as one that sought to deny ethical responsibility, the Australian government did
discuss ethical obligation in the context of its commitment to Australia’s domestic
population. This conception of ultimate responsibility to domestic populations
provides an important foundation (as it does for pluralist approaches to international
society) for the presentation of sovereignty and non-intervention as interchangeable.
Immigration Minister Ruddock argued that:
The Australian public has a clear expectation that Australian sovereignty, including in the
matter of entry of people to Australia, will be protected by this parliament and the
government. The Australian public expects its government to exert control over our borders
. . .60
Senator Hill argued that ‘the community expects us to put in place measures to
protect Australia’s borders’,61 again defining the government’s policies and concep-
tion of sovereignty as consistent with, if not ultimately derived from, public opinion.
Such a representation may be viewed as an attempt to shore up or construct public
support rather than simply reflect it, a point relevant to the broader question of how
54 Howard, Hansard, 29 August 2001, p. 30569.
55 Ruddock, Hansard, 18 September 2001, p. 30869.
56 Hill, Senate Hansard, 30 August 2001, p. 27090.
57 Howard, Interview with Alan Jones.
58 Santo Santoro, Senate Hansard, 16 June 2003, p. 11353.
59 Of course, this representation of the ‘nonsense’ of arguments regarding the increasingly untenable
idea of exclusive sovereignty appears inconsistent with the fact that human rights commitments
made by Australia, specifically regarding asylum-seekers, already implicitly rejected this conception
(Pace, Senate Select Committee) and that the government appeared willing to compromise its
sovereignty (defined in exclusive terms) regarding other areas of interdependence sovereignty such
as trade, for example (see Maley, ‘Asylum-Seekers’, p. 189).
60 Ruddock, Hansard, 18 September 2001, pp. 30869–72.
61 Hill, Hansard, 30 August 2001, p. 27090.
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this conception of sovereignty came to ‘win out’ over others in the Australian
context. Senator Santoro contended that it was ‘our duty as a legislature . . . to make
our borders as impermeable as possible . . .’62 Prime Minister Howard invoked both
public opinion and Australia’s national interests in arguing that:
I’ve got to reflect public opinion but I’ve also got to defend the national interest and it is
clearly not in Australia’s national interest to continue to be saying to the world, we are an
easy target.63
The government’s ethical defence of its approach to asylum-seekers was that its
commitment to exclusive sovereignty was consistent with the ultimate (ethical)
responsibility that governments have to their domestic populations. Of course,
questions must arise regarding which voices in the domestic context are prioritised or
marginalised, and it is far from self-evident that popular policies or sovereignty
defined as the right to exclude are necessarily in the national interest.64 Nevertheless,
the government ultimately positioned its ethical responsibility to the domestic
population in preserving the integrity of Australia’s borders as ‘trumping’ a more
humane treatment of asylum-seekers. This conception of the boundaries of ethical
responsibility in foreign policy was captured in a more general sense by Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer in 2002:
The Government has a responsibility for the national interest and to fight for the interest of
all Australians. But we have to be responsive to the values and ethics of the Australian
people. These are the twin pillars . . . upon which I base Australian foreign policy.65
To reiterate, the government’s conception of sovereignty, invoked to deny the
claims/entry of asylum-seekers, can be defined as a ‘right to exclude’. This conception
was presented in such a way as to marginalise alternative accounts of sovereignty,
through presenting sovereignty as the ‘right to exclude’ as a legal and normative right
of states in international society and as a manifestation of the ultimate obligations
states have to their own citizens. This conception of sovereignty is consistent with a
pluralist English School account of sovereignty, wherein sovereignty defined as
non-intervention is the sole basis of an international society itself, the best means of
realising and preserving individual rights, and where the violation of this norm in the
act of prioritising others (universal human rights, for example) could even threaten
the foundation of international order.66 The consistency of this worldview with
the government’s general foreign policy orientation was underscored by Foreign
Minister Downer’s reference to English School theorist Martin Wight, albeit
incorrectly identified by Downer as a Realist. Downer argued in mid-2002 that:
the Government has ensured that Australia’s national interest is advanced in an ambitious
yet pragmatic and clear-minded fashion. Because if we don’t . . . no one else will. To
borrow the words of English realist Martin Wight, ‘a foreign minister is chosen and paid to
look after the interests of his [sic] country, and not to delegate for the human race’. We are
not about trumpeting our own international good citizenry simply for the sake of it. That is
62 Santoro, Hansard, 16 June 2003, p. 11353.
63 Howard, Interview with Alan Jones.
64 On the Australian government’s definition of its national interest and in particular on the choices
and assumptions made in conceiving of Australia’s national interests in these ways, see Camilleri,
‘A Leap into the Past’.
65 Downer, National Press Club Speech.
66 Bull, The Anarchical Society; Jackson, The Global Covenant.
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a trap for the ideologues and the naïve. We are about good international citizenry where it
can be shown to deliver tangible results for our interests and those of other people’.67
This statement demonstrates not only the consistency of the government’s conception
of sovereignty regarding asylum-seekers in 2001–03 with its foreign policy worldview,
but provides a useful insight into the ways in which ethical responsibility was defined
by the Howard government through its representation of sovereignty.
To the extent that the Australian government did recognise the need to accept
asylum-seekers at all, this was grounded less in the responsibilities of a (wealthy,
liberal-democratic) state to uphold core norms and rules of international society
than in the values and goodwill of Australia and Australians. Such engagement
with Australian beliefs and values was again an important means through which
this conceptualisation of sovereignty and obligation was able to resonate with
the Australian population and triumph over competing conceptualisations of
sovereignty. Central to this project was the consistent emphasis on Australia’s strong
human rights record. In the days following Tampa, Prime Minister John Howard
argued that ‘we’re trying to balance our legitimate right to preserve our border
integrity with our very legitimate concern as a nation that for generations has taken
refugees from all around the world’.68 He also argued that:
this is an awful problem for Australia. On the one hand we want to defend our borders,
rightly so, on the other hand, we are a decent people, we don’t behave in a way that causes
people to drown and die, we don’t shoot people, we don’t carry on in that fashion and it’s
probably because of that that we are seen by many around the world as a soft touch.69
Howard also noted that it was ‘monstrously unfair to describe Australia as heartless
and inhumane’, and referred to Australia’s ‘magnificent refugee record’.70 More
fundamentally, he argued that ‘we are Australian. We don’t behave barbarically’.71
As such, the government defined its commitment to behaving in a ‘decent’ manner
towards asylum-seekers as arising from its own values rather than being necessitated
by the terms of the international human rights regime. Through this characterisation,
the Australian government was able to maintain its ultimate right to deny consider-
ation to those outside the borders of the Australian state. While more progressive
than an outright rejection of any and all claims for asylum within Australia, such an
approach has worrying implications given the prioritisation of the ‘right to exclude’
over an obligation to assist.
Representations of asylum-seekers
The attempt to ensure that the government’s conceptualisation of sovereignty ‘won
out’ over others (or, more positively, resonated with the Australian population) was
most evident in the government’s representation of asylum-seekers themselves.
67 Downer, National Press Club Speech.
68 John Howard, Interview with Rosemary Church CNN, 31 August 2001, 〈http://www.pm.gov.au/
news/interviews/2001/interview1203.htm〉.
69 Howard, Interview with Alan Jones.
70 Howard, Ibid.
71 John Howard, Interview with Charles Woolley, 60 Minutes, 2 September 2001, 〈http://
www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2001/interview1210.htm〉.
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Indeed, these representations may be viewed as attempts to create a context in which
Australians viewed asylum-seekers themselves as less worthy of ethical consideration
not simply because they came from ‘outside’, but because their conduct (indeed their
humanity) was fundamentally inconsistent with the values of Australians. This is an
important point to note given, as Walzer argues, that it becomes harder to justify
inaction in the face of an outsider’s suﬀering if that individual shares similar beliefs,
values or characteristics with the political community concerned.72 By extension, a
concerted attempt to emphasise diﬀerence in values or beliefs becomes a useful means
of justifying inaction and even constructing the costs of allowing entry to ‘diﬀerent
others’ as unacceptably high. The Australian government variously (and often)
portrayed asylum-seekers as ‘illegals’, ‘queue-jumpers’, ‘criminals’ and ‘potential
terrorists’. The fact that some of these characterisations were empirically question-
able,73 while other government claims about asylum-seekers were quite simply
fabrications,74 demonstrates how far the Australian government was willing to go to
create support for its conception of sovereignty and associated asylum-seeker
policies.
As soon as the Tampa incident began, Prime Minister Howard began to refer to
the illegality of asylum-seekers’ actions and to asylum-seekers themselves as ‘illegals’.
In August 2001, he said allowing the Tampa to enter:
could have led to the illegal entry of the persons on board into Australia, thus undermining
Australia’s control over its sovereign territory . . . There is no doubt that the integrity of
the borders of Australia has been under increasing threat from the rising flood of
unauthorised arrivals.75
These terms, and associated representations of ‘queue-jumping’, were repeated over
the following two days, when the Prime Minister contrasted ‘people who are
queue-jumping’ with ‘genuine refugees’76 and when he repeated his diﬀerentiation
between asylum-seekers who followed ‘proper assessment procedures’ and those who
‘jump their place in the queue’ adding:
. . . we are opposed to a situation where people can force their way to the front of the
queue, arrive illegally, and having got to Australia in eﬀect push other people out of the
way.77
The example of ‘queue-jumping’ provides a particularly useful insight into the ways
in which the government sought to represent its asylum-seeker policy in a way that
was understandable and amenable to the Australian population. Specifically, the idea
72 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 49.
73 For example, the use of the term ‘illegals’ prioritises domestic legal constructions of what
constitutes authorised arrival. This contradicts Article 31 of the UN Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (to which Australia is a signatory), which specifies that there should be no
penalty by signatories to the Convention for entry by asylum-seekers without legal authorisation.
The use of the term ‘queue-jumpers’ is also empirically questionable in that it implies the existence
of an ordered or legitimate ‘queue’ for processing of claims for asylum which often does not exist
(see Gelber, ‘A Fair Queue?’). Finally, there has been no evidence of terrorists being among those
seeking asylum since 2001, and this link has been rejected by a range of analysts: see Michael
Madigan, ‘Boat terror links claimed’, The Courier-Mail, 20 September 2001, p. 2.
74 For example, in the lead up to the 2001 Federal election the Defence Minister Peter Reith claimed
to have evidence that asylum-seekers were throwing children overboard, a claim acknowledged by
the government (after the election) to have been untrue.
75 Howard, Hansard, 29 August 2001, p. 30569.
76 Howard, Interview with Alan Jones.
77 Howard, Interview with Rosemary Church.
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of egalitarianism has been central to dominant narratives of Australian beliefs,
identity and values,78 and portraying asylum-seekers as behaving in a manner
inconsistent with this ‘core Australian value’ through jumping a queue may be
viewed as an attempt to portray asylum-seekers arriving by boat as having values
inconsistent with that of Australians.
In September the Prime Minister reiterated that the government ‘will do every-
thing we can . . . to deter people from coming here illegally’79 and he called the
asylum-seekers on the Tampa ‘illegal immigrants’, adding ‘if you allow illegal
immigration of that type to interrupt the refugee flow you really are allowing those
people to go ahead of others’.80 In October 2001 when the Australian government
accused asylum-seekers of deliberately throwing their children into the sea to
provoke rescue – a charge later revealed to have been fabricated – the Prime Minister
said, ‘I don’t want in Australia people who would throw their own children into the
sea. I don’t. I don’t think any Australian does.’81 Again, such a representation served
to position asylum-seekers as acting in ways inconsistent with Australian values. The
association between asylum-seekers, criminality and dubious character was devel-
oped to a further (and arguably absurd) level after the terrorist events of September
11th. Peter Slipper, for example, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for
Administration and Finance, stated in an interview on 19 September 2001 that:
there is a connection between illegals and terrorists and we ought to consider that many of
the people that claim to be refugees are people who come from Afghanistan . . . It’s not
beyond the realms of possibility that the Taliban regime could well be sending people to
Australia as terrorists under the guise of illegals.82
When Australia became subject to external criticism for its policies towards asylum
seekers, these themes continued to be iterated. In reply to United Nations’ criticisms
of mandatory detention, for example, a joint statement by Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer, Immigration Minister Ruddock and the Attorney-General
Darryl Williams emphasised their view that ‘people in immigration detention have
arrived in the country illegally’.83 In an interview in August 2002, Foreign Minister
Downer and Trade Minister Mark Vaile repeated:
we want to crack down on illegal immigration . . . These people, these political activists on
the issue of illegal immigration, are basically trying to break down the capacity of Australia
to deal with the problem of illegal immigration.84
Aside from depicting claims for asylum as illegitimate based purely on mode of arrival
rather than on the substance of claims to refugee status, these representations amount
78 Elaine Thompson, Fair Enough: Egalitarianism in Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1994). Although
Thompson argues that while a central component of how Australians see themselves and in
dominant narratives of national identity, the notion of egalitarianism is not necessarily reflected in
either policy or the material distribution of resources.
79 John Howard, Interview at Sydney Airport, 8 September 2001, 〈http://www.pm.gov.au/news/
interviews/2001/interview1223.htm〉.
80 John Howard, Interview with Jim Lehrer, News Hour PBS, Washington DC, 10 September 2001,
〈http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2001/interview1232.htm〉.
81 In Kelly, ABC TV.
82 Peter Slipper, Interview with Seven Sunrise Cover Story: The Refugee Crisis, 2 September 2001,
〈http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,2898609%255E1702,00.html〉.
83 Downer et al., Joint Media Release FA109.
84 Alexander Downer and Mark Vaile, Doorstop Interview in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 1 August
2002, 〈http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2002/20801_fa_malmou_unhchr_aftacer_dprk.html〉.
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to a vilification of asylum-seekers by questioning their humanity. Such representations
of asylum-seekers are reminiscent of Neta Crawford’s characterisation of ‘identity
arguments’, which ‘posit that people of a certain kind act or don’t act in certain ways
and that the audience of the argument either positively or negatively identifies with the
people in question’.85 Such representations are again important in considering how
particular conceptions of sovereignty might be accepted by domestic populations.
Opposition Member of Parliament Carmen Lawrence acknowledged the political
functions of these forms of representation in arguing that:
. . . the government has systematically breached every principle of decency and humanity,
judging that there is electoral advantage in vilifying and damaging people who are easily
characterised as unlike us and unworthy of our assistance. ‘Queue jumpers; they are
wealthy; they are illegals’. All that language is designed to make people think these are not
human beings with feelings and needs like ours.86
The above examples demonstrate the government’s willingness to portray asylum-
seekers as ‘others’: outsiders who are fundamentally diﬀerent from Australians in
their values and beliefs; who are attempting to exploit the goodwill of Australia and
its people; and who potentially pose a direct security threat. These representations are
important in reducing empathy for the plight of asylum-seekers domestically and in
constructing the government’s conception of sovereignty (as the right to exclude) as
a legitimate and appropriate conception of sovereignty in this context. Exclusion is
achieved discursively, as an act of a sovereign power. The government’s willingness
and commitment to portraying asylum-seekers in this way also questions the idea of
a government compelled to develop apparently harsh policies towards asylum-seekers
by the demands of that population or expectations of international society. If such
was the case, there would be little need on the government’s part to selectively
represent asylum-seekers as others, and particularly misrepresent their behaviour to
reinforce this otherness. Once again, acknowledging this point allows us to recognise
that there is nothing inevitable about conceiving of sovereignty in such terms, despite
the fact that such representations are increasingly apparent in the developed world.87
Positioning Australia’s critics
The final form of representations addressed here are the government’s depictions of
critics of its approach to asylum-seekers and associated conception of sovereignty.
85 Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), p. 24.
86 Lawrence, Hansard, p. 4423.
87 This trend is particularly evident in Europe. Italy’s former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, for
example, used similar language to the Australian government in justifying hard-line approaches to
asylum and immigration by referring to the danger of the EU being ‘swamped’ by an ‘immigration
time bomb’ (in Alan Travis, ‘EU revives Blunkett’s asylum camp plan’, The Guardian, 20
September 2004, p. 9). Human rights organisations have also described plans in the European
Union to establish refugee processing camps in northern Africa, which would serve to deny
asylum-seekers direct access to developed states in Europe, as ‘an abandonment of Europe’s
historic commitment to refugee protection’ (Phil Bloomer et al., ‘Scrap asylum camp plans’, The
Guardian, 22 September 2004, p. 27). As Geddes argues, ‘European countries have actually
increased both their capacity and willingness to control immigration, especially migration flows
defined by state policies as unwanted, such as asylum seekers . . .’. (Andrew Geddes, The Politics of
Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: Sage, 2003), p. 20).
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This is important to note in understanding that supposedly ‘commonsense’ accounts
of sovereignty are contestable and contested, providing possibilities for progressive
change; and that the process of marginalising or silencing these alternative voices is
central to the construction of support or resonance for particular conceptions of
sovereignty and ethical responsibility. In an important sense, the direct physical
exclusion of asylum-seekers was mirrored by the government’s attempt to margin-
alise those voices critical of its asylum-seeker policy. The government even portrayed
critics of its policies in similar ways to asylum-seekers themselves: as unconcerned
about the realisation or preservation of the rights and values of Australians. As
noted, the Australian government was dismissive of United Nations’ criticisms of its
policies towards asylum-seekers. For example, in response to a question regarding
Justice Bhagwati’s criticisms, Foreign Minister Downer stated that:
I think it is important that the United Nations and its institutions work closely with an
advanced liberal democracy like Australia – the world’s sixth oldest continuously operating
democracy – and it is important that the United Nations examine the facts very carefully
when they look into issues like this, rather than just listen to the howling of the political
critics of the government or people who are pushing a particular political barrow.88
A joint media release by Foreign Minister Downer, Immigration Minister Ruddock
and Attorney-General Darryl Williams reiterated the government’s belief that
Justice Bhagwati’s report ‘lacks objectivity and misrepresents important aspects of
Australia’s management of immigration detention’, adding, ‘nothing in Justice
Bhagwati’s report is cause to change the view that Australia’s system of immigration
detention is eﬀective . . .’.89 Again the day after this media release Foreign Minister
Downer and Trade Minister Vaile, in a doorstop interview, reiterated:
It is not a professional report. It’s a very emotive report . . . This is a report which is
neither comprehensive nor accurate . . . this sort of activist lobbying of the United Nations
and the United Nations producing these reports which it’s done on several occasions, is
having the eﬀect of undermining in Australia the credibility of the United Nations.90
Later the same year, after the United Nations issued another condemning report,
Downer and Ruddock issued another joint media release. This continued the
argument that there were ‘fundamental flaws in the UN human rights committee
system’. The Australian government argued that:
The report is particularly disappointing as it has made similar errors to the report of
Justice Bhagwati . . . Yet again, a human rights body has produced a report misguidedly
critical of Australia at a time when greater focus on egregious human rights abuses
elsewhere in the world would have been more appropriate.91
These depictions of international criticism broadly, and UN criticism in particular,
can again be viewed as an attempt to silence, marginalise and de-legitimise alternative
voices on the sovereignty-human rights relationship in this context. In undermining
the extent to which UN criticism might be seen as a legitimate intervention on this
issue, the Australian government has variously described the United Nations as
listening to the wrong people (domestic critics of the government); idealised; lacking
objectivity; misrepresentative; unprofessional; emotive; inaccurate; fundamentally
88 Downer, Hansard, 30 May 2002, p. 2773.
89 Downer et al., Joint Media Release FA109.
90 Downer and Vaile, Doorstop Interview in Brunei.
91 Downer and Ruddock, Joint Media Release FA184.
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flawed; and misguidedly critical. Such representations both reflect the government’s
conception of sovereignty and are important in creating conditions in which this
conception can predominate over alternative accounts of sovereignty and ethical
responsibility.
In responding to domestic criticism, the Australian government has undertaken a
similar discursive strategy: of exclusion, condemnation and disparagement. When
the Tampa incident began the main Opposition party in the Federal parliament, the
Australian Labor Party, initially supported the government’s policies. Later criticism
from the Opposition, however, was met with derision and vilification by the Conservative
Government. In a joint press conference on 1 September 2001, Howard and Ruddock
argued that the ‘duty of an opposition on an occasion like this [was] to steadfastly
support the national interest’.92 The following day, Liberal Party MP Peter Slipper
described the Labor Party as ‘traitors to Australia. They’re not fit to govern.’93 In
parliament Downer said that the Opposition ‘do not stand up for the strong protection
of Australia’s borders’.94 In 2002, Immigration Minister Ruddock argued that:
The choice for the opposition is now clear. They can either support strong and eﬀective
border controls or they can contribute to the weakening of Australia’s borders and the
perils arising from this action.95
He repeated this exact phrase in parliament nine months later,96 and again in a
slightly modified form in a Media Release in June 2003 when he stated, ‘they should
have been supporting strong and eﬀective border controls. Instead, they have again
demonstrated they are intent on weakening Australia’s borders’.97
The Australian Government’s depiction of the Opposition was of course influ-
enced by the tenor of debate in an adversarial parliamentary chamber. Nevertheless,
in seeking to disparage Opposition criticism, the government was able to do two
things: attempt to marginalise these voices from the policy process and the
construction of sovereignty by portraying them as unconcerned about the nation’s
core values and interests; and utilise a form of what Janice Bially Mattern describes
as ‘representational force’, which enables the ‘user’ to ‘bluntly, self-interestedly and
non-negotiably compel his victim to abide by his version of some contested story’.98
The apparent willingness of the major Opposition party to accept the central
dimensions of the government’s asylum-seeker policy may be viewed in this context,
particularly given the extent of public support that the Australian government had
been instrumental in creating.99
92 John Howard and Phillip Ruddock, Joint Press Conference, Sydney, 1 September 2001,
〈http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2001/interview1206.htm〉.
93 Slipper, Interview with Seven Sunrise.
94 Downer, Hansard, 18 June 2002, p. 3606.
95 Phillip Ruddock, House of Representatives Hansard, 20 June 2002, p. 4019.
96 Ibid., 26 March 2003, p. 13586.
97 Phillip Ruddock, Media Release MPS37.2003, 17 June 2003, 〈http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/
media_releases/ruddock_media03/r030307.htm〉.
98 Janice Bially Mattern, ‘The Power Politics of Identity’, European Journal of International Relations,
7: 3 (2001), p. 351.
99 A national opinion poll conducted within weeks of the Tampa incident in September 2001 indicated
that 77% of the Australian population supported the government’s position in denying the Tampa
entry to Australia, while 71% supported the government’s policy of indefinite detention of
asylum-seekers (AC Nielsen poll in Burke, In Fear of Security, p. 323).
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The Australian government has variously portrayed an exclusive interpretation of
sovereignty as a commonsense response to international norms and domestic
responsibilities; has depicted asylum-seekers themselves as diﬀerent others whose
values are inconsistent with those held by Australians; and has disparaged and
attempted to de-legitimise alternative voices and associated interpretations of
sovereignty. These dynamics are important to recognise in making sense of how
certain conceptions of sovereignty and responsibility come to prominence in particu-
lar contexts, even while also pointing to possibilities for alternative accounts, with
radically diﬀerent political implications, to emerge.
Inclusion, exclusion and immanent possibility
For post-structural international relations theorists such as R. B. J. Walker, Australia’s
rejection of the claims of asylum-seekers on the basis of the imperative of preserving
its sovereignty is not particularly surprising. Sovereignty in this account is predicated
upon exclusion and the inherently dichotomous relationship between inside and
outside.100 This dichotomy even extends to the point that those inside (citizens) are
positioned as in need of being protected from threatening others in the realm of
disorder and insecurity outside (asylum-seekers).101 This was certainly evident in the
(at times farcical) attempts to present asylum-seekers as potential terrorists. But
accounts of political autonomy and particularly ethical responsibility are always
contested and contestable, and the constructed nature of concepts such as sovereignty
means that there always exist immanent possibilities for progressive change.
A range of actors has contested the Australian government’s image of sovereignty
as the right to exclude. International legal analysts and opposition political parties
have pointed to the ways in which Australia’s commitment to various dimensions
of the international human rights regime has entailed precisely the refutation of the
idea of sovereignty defined as exclusion.102 A range of critics and minor political
parties has directly pointed to the use of rhetorical strategies by the government:
in attempting to construct sovereignty as the ‘right to exclude’; and (crucially)
in attempting to ensure that this conception of sovereignty resonates with the
Australian population.103 Analysts have pointed to the inconsistency of the govern-
ment’s conception of sovereignty in defining asylum-seeker policy with other
dimensions of its foreign policy that appear willing to accept increasing global
interdependence and even external involvement in domestic politics.104 Finally, other
political representatives have identified (and contested) the ways in which the
government has attempted to position opponents of the government’s ‘impoverished’
sovereignty.105
100 Walker, Inside/Outside.
101 On the positioning of asylum-seekers as security threats, see for example Roxanne Doty,
‘Immigration and the Politics of Security’, Security Studies, 8 (2/3) (1998/9), pp. 71–93 and Jef
Huysmans, ‘Defining Social Constructivism: the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security’,
Alternatives: Global, Local Political, 27 Special Issue (2002), pp. 41–62.
102 Andrew Bartlett, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2001, p. 27693; Pace, Senate Select Committee.
103 Bartlett, Hansard; Maley, ‘Asylum-Seekers’, pp. 188–90; McMaster, Asylum Seekers.
104 Maley, ‘Asylum-Seekers’.
105 Natasha Stott-Despoja, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2001, p. 27702; Burke, In Fear of Security,
pp. 329–31.
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Debate has also occurred in relation to directions in asylum-seeker policy.
Legal analysts, minor party representatives, NGOs and even former Conservative
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser have pointed to Australia’s legal and
ethical obligations to accept asylum-seekers reaching Australia and to treat them
more humanely.106 Opposition political party representatives have contested the
vilification and demonisation of asylum-seekers by the Australian government and
linked this vilification to the government’s political objectives (including electoral
victory in 2001).107 In the face of concerted and ongoing pressures such as these, as
well as Australia’s stated continued rhetorical commitment to addressing the needs
and concerns of asylum-seekers, domestic policy is susceptible to change. Indeed,
minor progressive changes in Australia’s policies in 2004 and 2005108 have largely
been the product of such pressures. While prospects for further progressive change
under the conservative government should not be overstated, such incremental policy
shifts do point to possibilities for further changes in Australia’s treatment of
asylum-seekers and associated conception of sovereignty as the right to exclude.
That contestation of the Australian government’s conception and representation
of sovereignty and their policy choices regarding asylum-seekers has failed to
challenge the government’s over-arching approach thus far is probably related to two
central factors. First, the institutional capacity and legitimacy granted to government
representatives in defining the ‘national interest’. Second, the capacity (and willing-
ness) of the Australian government to position marginalised voices as un-Australian
or unconcerned with the preservation of Australian security and national interests.
Under these circumstances, the government has been in a particularly strong position
to define the nature of Australia’s approach and to construct public opinion that it
has subsequently claimed it is responding to.
For some analysts, the Australian government’s policies and the level of support
they enjoy domestically reflect a dark image of Australian identity, one defined by
racism and fear of the other.109 By this account, Australia’s contemporary approach
to asylum-seekers is the latest in a series of racist policies and practices beginning with
the dispossession and genocide of its indigenous population and manifesting itself in
the White Australia Policy in 1901.110 However, two points serve to question such a
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conclusion. First, it does not allow us to understand changes in Australia’s policies
towards immigration and asylum-seekers over time. Second, it serves to obscure the
importance of representation, reification and construction of Australian identity and
national interest, rather tending to present it as a timeless and unchanging account of
the Australian subject and Australian values.
Sovereignty defined as the ‘right to exclude’ is unambiguously problematic for
refugees and asylum-seekers. As we have noted, this conception of sovereignty in the
Australian context has underpinned policies of detection and interception of
asylum-seekers arriving by boat. These policies involve the devotion of significant
resources to addressing manifestations rather than causes of a tragic problem: to
preventing Australians from being forced to confront the suﬀering of outsiders.
Indeed, the acceptance of this conception of sovereignty as legitimate allows for other
policies that deny the imperative of redressing the suﬀering of outsiders as similarly
legitimate. Policies of mandatory detention of asylum-seekers, rolling visa systems
(that institutionalise uncertainty about the future for asylum-seekers), and an
ungenerous quota system cannot be easily separated from the conception of ethical
responsibilities inherent in the government’s exclusive conception of sovereignty. The
Australian case serves to demonstrate that through the strategic use of representa-
tional practices, and the political will to do so, states can construct the right to
exclude as the need to exclude. This points to the inherent limits of statist accounts
of ethical responsibility, and raises fundamental questions about the prospects for
redressing the suﬀering of the most vulnerable in global politics.
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